We investigate how …rms strategically use self-promoting and comparative advertising to push up own brand perception along with pulling down the brand images of targeted rivals. To this purpose, we …rst watch individual video …les of all TV advertisements in the US OTC analgesics industry for the 2001-2005 time period to code the content of each ad and organize it into a unique and novel dataset. Then, we develop a simple model of targeting advertising, which we use to derive the advertising …rst order conditions that predict oligopoly equilibrium relations between advertising levels (for di¤erent types of advertising) and market shares.
Introduction
This paper investigates how …rms strategically use self-promoting and comparative advertising to push up own brand perception along with pulling down the brand images of targeted rivals. 1 While non-comparative advertising involves only positive promotion, a comparative advertisement, by comparing one's own product in favorable light relative to a rival, has both a positive promotion component (in common with noncomparative advertising) and an indirect e¤ect through denigrating a rival. Denigration can be per se advantageous insofar as consumers who switch from the demeaned product are picked up by the denigrating …rm. However, they may also be picked up by other rival …rms. This logic indicates a possible freerider situation in the provision of comparative advertising against any particular rival, but it also indicates an equilibrium at which each …rm's positive promotion (through both comparative and non-comparative channels) is devalued by others' comparative advertising. In this paper we propose a simple model of targeting advertising to determine who should do more of what kind of advertising against whom, and then use a novel dataset from the Over-The-Counter (OTC) analgesics industry in the US to look for whether those relationships are actually there and how large they are.
Our push-pull model is based on a discrete choice approach to demand, in which …rms'perceived qualities are shifted by advertising. The way in which advertising enters the model is most simply thought of as persuasive advertising that shifts demand up. 2 Promoting one's own product increases demand directly, whether through non-comparative advertising or comparative advertising, while denigrating a rival helps a …rm indirectly by decreasing perceived rival quality. 3 By hurting the rival product directly, some consumers are diverted, and the comparative advertiser succeeds in attracting some portion of those consumers.
We use our simple model to derive the advertising …rst order conditions that predict oligopoly equilibrium relations between advertising levels (for di¤erent types of advertising) and market shares. In particular, we use the equilibrium pricing (…rst-order) conditions to eliminate prices from the relation between advertising and sales. 4 Then, we relate ad levels of the di¤erent ad types to other observable market variables, like market shares. 2 This is, for example, consistent with "hype" in the Johnson and Myatt (2004) taxonomy of demand shifts. We can though also reconcile our formulation with other advertising types. Most simply, the formulation is consistent with complementary advertising of the type propounded by Stigler-Becker (1977) and Becker and Murphy (1993) . Indeed, one can readily append advertising in the standard discrete choice approach underpinning to the logit demand, as we present below. Alternatively, it is easy to formulate a representative consumer utility function to underlie the demand model, along the lines of Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1988) , and introduce advertising into it. 3 A somewhat similar approach is expounded in Harrington and Hess (1996) . These authors treat positive and negative advertising by 2 politicians with given locations in a policy space. Negative advertising shifts a rival candidate away from the median voter, while positive advertising shifts a candidate closer. This framework would indeed provide an interesting base to develop a product market model. 4 One advantage of this approach is that we bypass having to deal with price data, which involves multiple price points for multiple variants of the same brand, along with various other problems associated to price data. 5 These variables are in turn determined simultaneously in a market equilibrium game between pro…t maximizing …rms. Firms with a lot of advertising are also typically those with large market shares. They also tend to set high prices. This is of course not to say that high prices drive high market shares, nor, more subtly, that advertising creates high prices, nor indeed is it the high prices that create the desire to advertise. All of these variables are jointly determined, at a market equilibrium, and we show how they are determined within an industry from the …rms' equilibrium choices. What drives the results is the intrinsic brand "qualities" and the marginal e¢ ciency of advertising types across …rms. See Anderson and de Palma (2001) for an analysis of how qualities correlate with market shares and prices, in a context without advertising. Here, with advertising in the choice set, and interacting with quality parameters, the results are more nuanced, though we still …nd some strong relations between market shares and advertising of various types.
To estimate the advertising …rst order conditions we …rst of all need to …nd out how much in practice is spent on comparative advertising. This is not a simple matter because advertising spending by …rms, even when the data are available (which is already rare), is not broken down into comparative and noncomparative advertising. We must therefore look at each individual ad and determine whether or not it is comparative, and, if so, which is the target brand. This therefore requires a detailed coding of advertising content. Ideally, we should be able to analyze an industry for which comparative advertising is prevalent and represents a large fraction of industry sales, for which data on spending on ads is available for a full sample of …rms and for a reasonably long period of time. Furthermore, video …les (or audio …les for radio ads or photographic …les for newspaper/magazine ads) need to be available and their content readily coded for the desired information of comparison and targets. Fortunately, all these criteria are met with the US OTC industry. 6 We use data on national sales from AC Nielsen and advertising data on advertising expenditure (and movies) from TNS -Media Intelligence.
The crucial novelty of our approach is to code advertising content (focusing on comparative advertising) and organize it into a unique and original dataset. 7 We watched more than four thousands individual video …les of all TV advertisements in the US OTC analgesics industry for the 2001-2005 time period
and coded them according to their content. Speci…cally, we recorded whether the commercial had any comparative claims -whether the product was explicitly compared to any other products. If a commercial was comparative, we also recorded which brand (or class of drugs) it was compared to (e.g. to Advil or Aleve; or to Ibuprofen-based drugs).
There are two main methodological concerns that we need to address when estimating the advertising …rst order conditions: left-censoring of non-comparative and comparative advertising and endogeneity of market shares and advertising expenditures. Left-censoring occurs because in some periods some brands do not engage in non-comparative or comparative advertising (there are corner solutions). We control for the left-censoring by running Tobit regressions.
To control for the endogeneity of market shares and advertising expenditures, we use brand …xed e¤ects and two sources of exogenous variation. First, we construct a dataset of news shock that hit the OTC analgesic markets in the time period of analysis. 8 These shocks might interact with the advertising decisions, 6 Indeed, while explicit comparative advertising has ‡ourished in the United States over the past 20 years (with the blessing of the FTC), its prevalence varies widely across industries. The US OTC analgesics industry (basically, medicine for minor pain relief, involving as major brands Advil, Aleve, Bayer Aspirin, and Tylenol) exhibits high advertising levels in general, and extraordinary levels of explicit comparative claims on relative performance of drugs.Most of the advertising expenditures are for television ads. 7 See Liaukonyte (2009) for a related paper that uses this same dataset. 8 As we discuss later on, we follow an approach similar to Chintagunta, Jiang and Jin (2007) when constructing our dataset of news shocks. In particular, between 2001 and 2005, the OTC analgesics market endured several major medical news related "shocks". The most notable, but by no means the only ones, of these were the following. The withdrawals of the Prescription NSAIDs Vioxx (October, 2004) and Bextra (April, 2005) a¤ected the OTC NSAIDs market (which excludes Tylenol). Naproxen sodium, the active ingredient in Aleve was linked to increased cardiovascular risk, which led to a signi…cant sales decrease for Aleve (December, 2004) . The main idea here is that these shocks act as many natural experiments. The idea of using a natural and thus we cannot use them straight up as instrumental variables. However, adding these news shocks improves our empirical analysis dramatically.
Second, we use data on the prices of the generic products to construct measures of the marginal costs that …rms face to produce the corresponding branded product. Here, the generic price of a pill of Acetaminophen is used as an instrumental variable of the share of Tylenol, whose main active ingredient is Acetaminophen.
Thus, the prices of the generic products are the variables that are excluded from the utility function and that we use as instrumental variables in the estimation. 9 We show that adding the news shocks remove most of the endogeneity bias we could uncover, and the exclusion restriction on the generic prices provides, in practice, only a marginal contribution to the empirical analysis.
The main results are the following. With regard to self-promotion advertising we …nd: i) higher market shares are associated with higher non-comparative advertising, with an elasticity of self-promoting advertising expenditures to shares estimated to be between 1 and 1.5; ii) outgoing attacks are half as powerful as direct non-comparative ads in raising own perceived quality; iii) every dollar spent by its competitors on incoming attacks has a statistically and economically strong e¤ect on the perceived quality of the attacked brand..
With regard to comparative advertising we …nd that …rms have a greater incentive to attack larger …rms, and this incentive is increasing in the share of the attacker, with the elasticities of comparative advertising expenditures to own market shares and to market shares of the attacked …rm equal to 1. This result has a nice and simple interpretation: the return to attacking a large …rm is higher than the return to attacking a smaller …rms, since by attacking a larger …rm, the attacker can hope that a larger pool of consumers switch away from the attacked to the attacker. Similarly, a large …rm has a stronger incentive than a smaller …rm to attack because the probability that consumer switch to the larger …rm is higher than the probability that consumers switch to the smaller …rm. We also …nd that …rms carry attacks on their competitors jointly.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review the literature. Section 3 presents the theoretical model. Data and industry background are discussed in Section 4. We present the empirical speci…cation and discuss identi…cation of the model in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 discusses results and Section 8 provides the robustness analysis. Section 9 concludes.
Literature Review on Advertising
A lot of the economics literature on the economics of advertising has been concerned with the functions of advertising, and whether market provision is optimal. We here take more of a marketer's stance that advertising clearly improves demand (otherwise …rms would not do it), and we take a rather agnostic view of experiment to study the e¤ect of advertising (on prices) is the crucial insigth in Milyo and Waldfogel [1999] . 9 In addition we can interact these shocks with the price of the generic products and increase the number of instrumental variables that we use.
how it is the advertising actually works on individuals, and bundle it all into a single "persuasive"dimension.
Since we do not cover here the normative economics of the advertising, this is excusable. The innovations we pursue are in advertising competition, and in the new strategic direction of comparative advertising.
Theoretical Literature
Much of the economic theory of advertising has been concerned with the mechanism by which advertising a¤ects choice, and the welfare economics of the market outcome. 10 Moreover, much work has considered very particular market structures, most often monopoly.
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Persuasive Advertising. Much of the early work linked advertising to market power, and reached a fairly negative assessment that advertising is a wasteful form of competition. Kaldor (1950) and Galbraith (1958) saw the di¤erentiation achieved by advertising as spurious and arti…cially created by persuasion. Such persuasive advertising was thought to decrease social welfare by deterring potential competition and creating barriers for new entrants. Dixit and Norman (1978) , propose viewing persuasive advertising as shifting demand curves out, but they then take an agnostic view as to the welfare e¤ects of the shift (i.e., whether the demand curve before or after the advertising is a better representation of the true consumer bene…t from consuming the good). 12 Regardless, they suggest that there is a tendency for too much advertising.
Informative Advertising. The persuasive view and the idea that advertising fosters monopoly was …rst challenged by Telser (1964) who argued that advertising can actually increase competition through improving consumer information about products (see also Demsetz (1979) ). 13 Butters (1977) later formalized a monopolistically competitive model of informative advertising about prices, in which the level of advertising reach is socially optimal. These results were tempered somewhat by Grossman and Shapiro (1984) , who extended the advertising content to include (horizontal) product di¤erentiation.
14 Another informative role, albeit indirect information, is at the heart of "money-burning" models of signaling product quality. Nelson (1970 Nelson ( , 1974 claims that advertising serves as a signal of quality, especially in experience good markets, and reasons that consumers will rationally conclude that a …rm doing a lot of advertising must be selling a product of high quality. These insights were later formalized and further developed, most frequently by using repeat purchases as the mechanism by which a high-quality …rm recoups Butters (1977) model of informative advertising considers monopolistic competition and a homogenous good with zero pro…ts sent on each message. Grossman and Shapiro (1984) allow for oligopoly and product di¤erentiation (around a circle), but they use symmetry assumptions liberally. 1 2 This analysis is not uncontroversial: see the subsequent issues of the RAND journal for comments, replies, and rejoinders. Dixit and Norman (1978) posited that advertising increases demand, and then perform the welfare analysis using consumer surplus measures from that starting point, according to which demand curve embodies "true" tastes. 1 3 Indeed, informative advertising can reduce consumers' search costs to learn about the existence of products, their prices, qualities, and speci…cations. 1 4 Cristou and Vettas (2008) analyse a non-localized discrete choice version of the Grossman-Shapiro model. its advertising investment. 15 Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984) show a role for dissipative advertising in a perfectly competitive model. Milgrom and Roberts (1986) break out di¤erent roles for signaling quality through (low) price and through advertising by a monopoly, again using a repeat purchase mechanism. Fluet and Garella (2002) show that under duopoly there must always be dissipative advertising by the high quality …rm if qualities are similar enough.
Advertising as a Complementary Good. Another foundational role for advertising is proposed by Stigler and Becker (1977) and Becker and Murphy (1993) , who argue that advertising can be viewed as part of consumers'preferences in the same way as goods directly enter utility functions, and that there are complementarities between advertising levels and goods' consumption. Hence, ceteris paribus, willingness to pay is higher the more a good is advertised. The complementary goods approach a¤ords one clean way for advertising to a¤ect directly consumer well-being, and so gives a way of thinking about persuasive advertising.
The speci…cation we use in our model is most directly interpreted in this vein of complementary goods, insofar as we can interpret that advertising expenditures as boosting demand. However, since we will not be doing a welfare analysis with the model, we are not constrained to this interpretation, but instead our approach is broadly consistent with advertising as a demand shifter (as in Dixit and Norman (1978) ).
Modeling Comparative Advertising
The theoretical economics literature on comparative advertising is quite scarce. Modeling comparative advertising presents several alternative potential approaches. In common with much of the economics of advertising, these are perhaps complementary rather than substitute approaches, and elements of each are likely present (in di¤erent strengths) in di¤erent applications. Each though has drawbacks, and sometimes the predictions (e.g., comparative static properties) di¤er in direction.
One early contribution is Shy (1995) , who argues that comparative advertising of di¤erentiated products informs consumers about the di¤erence between the brand they have purchased in the past and their ideal brand. The model explains only brand switching behavior, because according to that setting comparative advertising is meaningless for the inexperienced consumer as she would not be able to comprehend an ad involving a comparison of the brands' attributes that she never consumed. another dislikes. The analysis is phrased in terms of informing all consumers: it does not allow for advertising reach that tells only some. The same critique can be leveled at other models in the …eld, as well as (perhaps to a lesser degree) the model we actually propose here; and we return to this criticism in the conclusions.
Signaling. Another approach to modeling comparative advertising takes as staging point the signaling model of advertising, which goes back to insights in Nelson and was formalized in Milgrom and Roberts (1986) . The original theory views advertising as "money-burning"expenditure which separates out low-quality from high quality producers. Equilibrium advertising spending, in this adverse-selection context, smokes out the low type because a low-type would never recuperate in repeat purchases the high level of spending indicated in 1 6 That paper builds on Anderson and Renault (2006) , who show that a monopoly …rm might limit information about its product attributes even if advertising has no cost. This result identi…es situations where a …rm is hurt by information disclosure about its own product, so there might be incentives for competitors to provide that information through comparative ads. 1 7 To understand the incentives to advertise requires understanding the bene…ts of more information on each …rm's pro…ts. With no information at all, …rms are homogenous apart from the quality advantage, and the large …rm can price out its advantage and still serve the whole market. It has no incentive to advertise because, while such advertising will raise the willingness to pay of consumers who discover they appreciate its product, it will also decrease the valuations of those who discover they like the product less than average, and so the …rm will lose customers to its rival as well as having to price lower to staunch the loss of consumer base. This means that the large …rm does not want to advertise, while the smaller rival does. These incentives extend to comparative advertising, which further enhances di¤erentiation and further erodes the customer base (and price) of the larger …rm to the advantage of the smaller one.
equilibrium. The comparative advertising version of this theory expounded in Barigozzi, Garella, and Peitz (2006) relies on the possibility of a law-suit to punish an untrue claim. Recently, Emons and Fluet (2008) also took a signaling approach to comparative advertising, although their analysis relies on advertising being more costly the more extreme are the claims it makes, instead of a law-suit.
Persuasion Games. In parallel work, we are developing another approach along the lines of the Persuasion Game of Milgrom (1981) and Grossman (1981) . In this work the …rms must (truthfully) announce levels of product characteristics their products embody. Comparative advertising, through this lens, involves announcing characteristics levels of rivals that those rivals would prefer to keep silent. However, the actual ads are quite vague for the most part in speci…cs of actual claims (e.g., a product may act "faster" than another, but it is not usually speci…ed how much faster, or indeed what the response time in minutes is for the two products or the statistical signi…cance of the di¤erence across di¤erent individuals, etc.)
Empirical Literature
In this Section we discuss the papers that are most closely related to ours and discuss the original contributions of our paper. 18 To do this, we identify four modeling choices that have to be made when empirically studying advertising: how to measure advertising; whether to use a static or a dynamic model of advertising;
whether to have a partial or a full equilibrium model, where both consumer and …rm sides of the market are explicitly modeled; and whether to model advertising as having only a persuasive or informative e¤ect, or both. Next, we discuss how the literature has dealt with these choices.
Advertising Content. Ours is the …rst paper to code the content of advertising into non-comparative and comparative ads and use the information to address the incentives to use the di¤erent types of advertising. behavior, where …rms jointly choose product prices and advertising levels. We consider a full equilibrium static model of the advertising and product markets, where advertising is determined endogenously within the model. We use the …rst order conditions and demand equations for the product (analgesics) to solve the prices out of the …rst order conditions for advertising. This procedure yields simple relations between ad levels and market shares, which we term "quasi-reaction functions" (they are not the full reaction functions because they still include market shares, which in turn depend on all prices and all advertising). We estimate the structural parameters of the model from these advertising …rst order conditions. Because advertising is likely to have long-run e¤ects on demand, the decision to use a static model to study advertising needs to be carefully justi…ed. This modeling decision is tightly linked to another one:
whether or not to have a full equilibrium model of the advertising and product markets. In short, estimating a fully dynamic equilibrium model even of just the product market is beyond what is feasible at this stage of the literature. 20 Previous work in advertising has either estimated a dynamic model of demand (Hendel 22 There are only two papers that allow for both e¤ects to be present, both by Ackerberg [2001, 2003 ].
2 0 The problem is both computational complexity and multiplicity of solutions. One would have to solve for rational and consistent expectations that consumers and producers have on the future values of the state variables, which means solving for a …xed point. There might be multiple future values of the state values for which such consistency requirements hold (that is, there might be multiple equilibria). 2 1 Although the latter paper presents a dynamic theoretical model of advertising, the econometric study estimates only the demand side parameters. These estimates are then used to calibrate the theoretical dynamic model. 2 2 Gasmi, La¤ont, and Vuong [1992] , Kadiyali [1996] , and Slade [1995] postulate a set of residual demand functions, which include advertising. Thus, the interpretation of the role of advertising as persuasive or informative is not transparent.
In order to identify the persuasive from the informative role, Ackerberg [2001, 2003] analyzes consumer reactions to the advertising of a new product (the yogurt Yoplait 150). Essentially, advertising is only informative for …rst buyers, while it is both informative and persuasive for repeat buyers. 23 This is a clever identi…cation device, but we cannot use it here because we have aggregate and not individual data (that is, we cannot identify …rst buyers).
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Our Push-Pull perspective on advertising is coherent with the persuasive view. In addition to positive persuasion on own quality, comparative advertising also gives negative persuasion on rivals.
Review of Similar Models of Advertising. We conclude this Section with a review of the three papers which deploy models of price and advertising competition that are close to ours. 25 Gasmi, La¤ont, and Vuong [1992] propose an empirical methodology for studying various types of collusive behavior in pricing and advertising. They derive two …rst order conditions (for prices and advertising) and one demand equation (for the product market, cola) for each …rm and estimate them all jointly. In many ways our approach is similar to the ones used in these three papers. We also use a theoretical model to derive the …rst order conditions for prices and advertising. There are, however, important di¤erences between our work and theirs. The main methodological di¤erences are related to how we code advertising content, how we model demand, the nature of the exogenous variation that we use to identify the model, and how we estimate the parameters of the model. 2 3 Ackerberg (2001 2 3 Ackerberg ( , 2003 argues that the observed facts that "experienced" consumers (those who have previously bought Yoplait 150) are much less sensitive to advertising than inexperienced ones is strong evidence in favor of advertising ful…lling an informative role rather than a "prestige" one. However, he does not control for the content of the particular ads in his sample; nor does he allow for the possibility (in his interpretation) that advertising 'prestige' could exhibit strong threshold e¤ects, which could also account for the observed behavior. 2 4 This identi…cation assumption excludes the possibility that a …rst buyer of a new product might have consumed other products of the same brand in the past, otherwise it is unclear that there is no persuasion e¤ect for that type of buyer. Thus, while very clever, this assumption might not hold in practice. 2 5 Other papers (e.g. Shum [2004] or Nevo [2000 Nevo [ ,2001 ) that use static models assume that advertising is exogenous, though they justify that assumption in their contexts. Clearly, these papers do not include …rst order conditions for advertising. 2 6 Kadiyali [1996] proposes an empirical methodology to investigate strategic entry and deterrence, where …rms compete in prices and advertising. Since she closely follows Gasmi, La¤ont, and Vuong [1992] , the methodological di¤erences between her paper and ours are the same as those between our paper and Gasmi, La¤ont, and Vuong [1992] .
First, all three look at the total advertising expenditure, while we distinguish between comparative and non-comparative advertising expenditures. Finally, our estimation methodology is di¤erent from those in the other papers. While they estimate a full set of simultaneous equations, we use the …rst order conditions for prices to solve the prices out of the advertising …rst order conditions. Thus, we fully exploit the theoretical model in the same way that they do, but we reduce the number of equations to be estimated. If the model is correctly speci…ed (which is the maintained assumption in their studies, as in ours), then the estimation results should be the same under the two approaches. 28 
The Model
The theoretical model suggests certain regularities between market shares and both non-comparative and comparative advertising. Notice that the predictions for non-comparative advertising hold without the more speci…c functional form restrictions imposed later for the comparative advertising case. These size-advertising relations therefore hold in more general settings and also even when there is no comparative advertising, and so they constitute a contribution to the understanding of the size-advertising relation which is broader than the particular comparative advertising application developed in the sequel.
We …rst describe the demand side assumptions and then we derive the equilibrium predictions from the model. These take the form of advertising intensities as a function of market shares, and they form the basis of the estimation which follows. As we will see, the key predictions are all supported by the data.
We assume that each product is associated to a quality index and demand depends on the quality indices of all …rms, in a manner familiar from, and standard in discrete choice analysis. These quality indices are in ‡uenced positively by own advertising (both non-comparative and comparative) and negatively by competitors'comparative advertising. They are also in ‡uenced by medical news shocks which unexpectedly indicate good news or bad news about the health e¤ects of the product(s).
Demand
Suppose that Firm j = 1; :::n charges price p j and has perceived quality Q j (:), j = 1; :::n. We retain the subscript j on Q j (:) because when we get to the econometrics, exogenous variables such as medical news shocks and random variables summarizing the unobserved determinants of perceived quality will enter the errors in the equations to be estimated.
Firms can increase own perceived quality through both types of advertising, and degrade competitors' quality through comparative advertising. Comparative advertising, by its very nature of comparing, both raises own perceived quality and reduces the perceived quality of rival products. The corresponding arguments of Q j (:) are advertising expenditure by Firm j which directly promotes its own product, denoted by A jj ; "outgoing" advertising by Firm j targeted against Firm k, A jk , k 6 = j, which has a direct positive e¤ect; and "incoming" comparative advertising by Firm k targeting Firm j, A kj , k 6 = j, which has a negative (detraction) e¤ect on Firm j's perceived quality. Thus, we write j's perceived quality as
fA kj g k6 =j ); j = 1; :::; n, which is increasing in the …rst argument, increasing in each component of the second (outgoing) group, and decreasing in each component of the third (incoming) group. 29 The demand side is generated by a discrete choice model of individual behavior where each consumer buys one unit of her most preferred good. We will not estimate this demand model from (aggregate) choice data;
we simply use it to frame the structure of the demand system. Preferences are described by a (conditional indirect) utility function:
in standard fashion, where
is the "objective" utility, and where we let the "outside option" (of not buying a painkiller) be associated to an objective utility 0 = V 0 . The parameter expresses the degree of horizontal consumer/product heterogeneity. 30 The structure of the random term determines the form of the corresponding demand function. At …rst, we do not impose further structure, but we later specialize (for the comparative advertising analysis) to the logit model to get a sharper set of benchmark properties. The corresponding market shares are denoted s j ; j = 0; :::; n, and each s j is increasing in its own objective utility, and decreasing in rivals'objective utilities. 31 Assume that there are M consumers in the market, so that the total demand for product j will be M s j , j = 0; :::; n.
Pro…ts
Assume that product j is produced by Firm j at constant marginal cost, c j .
Firm j 0 s pro…t-maximizing problem is:
Here > 1 re ‡ects that comparative advertising may be intrinsically more costly because of the risk involved that a competitor might challenge the ad and it will have to be withdrawn and replaced with a less suitable one. 32 The advertising quantities (the A's) are dollar expenditures. 33 The idea is that advertising expenditures will be optimally allocated across media (and times of day in the case of radio/TV). Then market prices for access to eyeballs (and eyeballs of di¤erent value to advertisers) should embody the condition that there should be no systematically better/cheaper way to reach viewers. The strong form of this (e¢ cient markets) hypothesis implicitly assumes that there are enough advertiser types, and there is no great di¤erence in the values of consumers to OTC analgesics advertising compared to other sectors. 34 We assume in what follows that pricing and advertising levels are determined simultaneously in a Nash equilibrium.
Firms'Optimal Choices
Pricing. Recalling that shares, s j , depend on all the 's, the price condition is determined in the standard manner by:
which yields a solution p j > c j : …rms always select strictly positive mark-ups.
Non-Comparative Advertising. The following analysis covers persuasive advertising generally, and is not con…ned to the speci…cs of the comparative advertising approach which follows.
Non-comparative advertising expenditures are determined by:
with equality if A jj > 0 j = 1; :::; n;
where the partial derivative function @Qj @Ajj may depend on any or all of the arguments of Q j (:). The pricing …rst-order condition (4) can be substituted into the advertising one (5) to give the equilibrium conditions:
with equality if A jj > 0; j = 1; :::; n:
Note this equation is general up to the assumption of quality not interacting with consumer type. 37 Thus, it is consistent with discrete choice models with an objective utility u = Q p+ "; also with a representative consumer model with = Q p in the usual price places.
The interpretation is the following. Raising A jj by $1 and raising price by $ @Qj @Ajj too leaves j unchanged. This change therefore increases the revenue by $ @Qj @Ajj on the existing consumer base (i.e., M s j consumers). This extra revenue is equated to the $1 marginal cost of the change, the RHS of (6) . We term the relation in (6) the non-comparative advertising quasi-reaction function. It is a function of whatever advertising variables are in Q j (note that they all involve …rm j as either emitter or target), along with j's share. This di¤ers from a full reaction function because it still may include j's other advertising choices, and because it includes the market share, which in turn includes all prices and advertising.
The relationship in (6) already gives a strong prediction for markets where there is no comparative advertising (e.g., when comparative advertising is barred). Indeed, suppose that the perceived quality changes 3 5 These conditions can be written in the form of elasticities. This yields Dorfman-Steiner conditions for di¤erentiated products oligopoly; the comparative advertising conditions below can also be written in such a form. 3 6 If @Q @A jj were constant (which would arise if ads entered perceived quality linearly), then it is unlikely that the system of equations given by (6) has interior solutions. Below we (implicitly) invoke su¢ cient concavity of Q j for interior solutions. 3 7 This would happen in a vertical model, for example.
with advertising in the same (concave) manner for all …rms. Then the …rms with larger market shares will advertise more. 38 The intuition is that the advertising cost per customer is lower for larger …rms. This is a useful characterization result for advertising in general: note (as per the discussion in the introduction) that it is not a causal relationship. The fundamental parameters of the model determine which …rms will be large and advertise more. For example, if …rms di¤er by intrinsic "quality" which is independent of the marginal bene…t from advertising (this is the case for our parameter W j in the econometric speci…cation below in Section 5), then one might expect that …rms with higher such quality will be those advertising more. 39 The same relation holds in the presence of comparative advertising, given some strong separability properties on
Proposition 1 (Non-Comparative Advertising levels) Let Q j (:) be additively separable, and let the function @Qj @Ajj be the same decreasing function of A jj for all …rms, j = 1; :::; n. Then, in equilibrium, …rms with larger market shares will use more non-comparative advertising.
Proof. From the relation (6), any …rm which is active in non-comparative advertising will set its corresponding advertising level to satisfy M s j @Qj @Ajj = 1. Since @Qj @Ajj is decreasing in A jj , …rms for which s j is larger will advertise more (choose a higher value of A jj ) than those with smaller market shares. For …rms with low enough market shares, from (4) the term (p j c j ) (5) is negative when @Qj @Ajj is evaluated at A jj = 0. Although we will not impose the strong separability in our estimation below (for reasons elucidated in Section ), the Proposition is still a useful benchmark (and indeed covers the case of no comparative advertising), even though the conditions given are strong. For the model we estimate, the Proposition holds, without imposing additive separability, as long as other advertising levels are constant.
We now turn to comparative advertising levels, employing a further restriction on demands.
Comparative Advertising. The general problem is more opaque than for own ads, so we use a logit formulation. Then, assuming the idiosyncratic match terms are i.i.d. with the Type 1 Extreme Value Distribution, the market share for Firm j (fraction of consumers buying from Firm j) will be given by the logit formulation as:
j = 0; :::; n;
This formulation has important properties (readily proved by simple di¤erentiation) useful to the subsequent development. First, cross e¤ects are given as:
:::; n; j 6 = k; (8) which is also the expression for
(such symmetry is a general property of linear random utility models: see Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse, 1992, Ch. 2, for example).
Second, the own e¤ect is readily derived as:
Using this expression, the price …rst-order condition (4) under the logit formulation is now
Recalling that the perceived quality is Q j (A jj ; fA jk g k6 =j ; fA kj g k6 =j ); j = 1; :::; n, we can determine the advertising spending against rivals by di¤erentiating (3) to get (for k = 1; :::; n; j = 1; :::n; k 6 = j):
with equality if A jk > 0.
Inserting the price …rst-order conditions (10) gives (for k = 1; :::; n; j = 1; :::n; k 6 = j):
The relation between market share and comparative advertising takes a particularly clean form when the quality function embodies a perfect substitutability relation. This formulation includes the Net Persuasion form used below in the estimation. Suppose therefore that the quality function can be written as Q j (A jj ; fA jk g k6 =j ; fA kj g k6 =j ) = Q j (A jj + k6 =j A jk ; fA kj g k6 =j ); j = 1; :::; n, where 0 < < 1 re ‡ects 4 0 These properties are related to the IIA property of the Logit model: as an option becomes more attractive, it draws customers from other products in proportion to the product of its own and their market shares. 4 1 When the (pure) non-comparative advertising level is positive, its condition gives (as before):
Hence we can write the comparative advertising …rst-order condition (for positive A jk ) as:
= ; k = 1; :::; n; j = 1; :::n; k 6 = j:
The …rst term on the LHS can naturally be interpreted as the marginal rate of substitution of the two ad types into perceived quality, the second term re ‡ects the additional bene…t from denigration, while the RHS is the relative price.
the idea that comparative advertising should not have a stronger direct e¤ect than non-comparative advertising. 42 Suppose for the present argument that the solution for non-comparative ads is interior. Then, the non-comparative advertising condition (M s j @Qj @Ajj = 1) implies that M s j @Qj @A jk = , and hence, using equation (11), we can write:
The intuition is as follows. Raising A jk by $1 is equivalent to brand k raising its price by $ @Q k @A jk (since the same k is attained). Such a rival price change (which j thus e¤ectuates through comparative advertising) causes j's market share to rise by sj s k . This increment is valued at M (p j c j ). By the price …rst-order condition, p j c j = 1 (1 sj ) , and (12) follows. This relation (12) generates two strong results that relate comparative advertising to market share. A su¢ cient condition for these results to hold is that the quality function takes one of the two following forms:
Q1. Let the quality function be Q j (A jj + k6 =j A jk ; fA kj g k6 =j ), with Q j (:) additively separable in incoming comparative ads, fA kj g k6 =j , with @Qj @A kj the same increasing function of A kj for all …rms, j; k = 1; :::; n.
Q2
. Let the quality function be Q j (A jj + k6 =j A jk k6 =j A kj ; fA kj g k6 =j ), with Q j (:) additively separable in Net Persuasion, A jj + k6 =j A jk k6 =j A kj , and incoming comparative ads, fA kj g k6 =j . Denote the marginal e¤ ect of A kj on Q j that does NOT come through Net Persuasion as @Q P ush j @A kj < 0, and assume this is the same increasing function of A kj for all …rms, j; k = 1; :::; n.
We are now ready to state the targeting share results.
Proposition 2 (Larger target more) Let the quality function satisfy either Q1 or Q2. Then, in equilibrium, for all …rms using a strictly positive level of non-comparative advertising, larger …rms will use more comparative advertising against each target.
Proof. Consider …rst …rms using a strictly positive level of comparative advertising against target k.
Then (12) holds with equality, i.e.,
We now consider the two di¤erent Q speci…cations.
Q1. For any given target k, note that the ratio sj (1 sj ) on the LHS above is decreasing in market share, s j . Hence @Q k @A jk (< 0) must be higher the larger is s j , and the corresponding A jk must be larger since 
This yields the comparative advertising quasi-reaction function for the case at hand. For any given target k, the ratio sj (1 sj ) on the LHS is decreasing in market share, s j . Hence
(< 0) must be higher the larger is s j , and the corresponding A jk must be larger since
is increasing and the same for all …rms.
This follows from the logit property that the fall-out is greater from peeling o¤ consumers from a larger rival. This suggests that the largest brands will also be those attacked most (Tylenol in our industry context.)
The property also extends to the case when the quality function depends on net persuasion and incoming attacks.
Looking from the perspective of attack targets as a function of attacker size, we have:
Proposition 3 (Larger targeted more) Let the quality function satisfy either Q1 or Q2. Then, considering attacks from …rms with positive levels of non-comparative advertising, in equilibrium, larger …rms su¤ er more attacks from each rival.
Proof.For Q1, the proof is analogous to that of Proposition 2, noting that for any given rival j, the LHS of (12) is increasing in market share of the …rm attacked, s k . For Q2, the result follows from (12) by noting (on the LHS) that the larger is s k , then the smaller must be
, which in turn means that A jk must be larger.
Before turning to the econometric speci…cations, we …rst discuss the data: note in particular that Table   2 below roughly supports the two preceding Propositions.
Description of Industry and Data
The OTC analgesics market is worth approximately $2 billion in retail sales per year (including generics) and covers pain-relief medications with four major active chemical ingredients. These are Aspirin, Acetaminophen, Ibuprofen, and Naproxen Sodium. The nationally advertised brands are such familiar brand names as Tylenol (acetaminophen), Advil and Motrin (ibuprofen), Aleve (naproxen sodium), Bayer (aspirin or combination), and Excedrin (acetaminophen or combination). Table 1 summarizes market shares, ownership, prices and advertising levels in this industry. 43 We use three di¤erent data-sets: (1) sales (2) advertising, and (3) medical news data. Sales and advertising data were collected by AC Nielsen and TNS -Media Intelligence respectively, and we coded the advertising content. We constructed the medical news data-set from publicly available news archives.
Sales Data
The product level data consist of average prices, dollar sales, and dollar market shares (excluding Wal-Mart sales) of all OTC oral analgesics products sold in the U.S. national market during the 5 years from March of 2001 through December of 2005 (a total of 58 monthly observations). 44 Products vary in package size (the number of pills) and the strength of the active ingredient in milligrams.
Episode of Pain. We construct a measure of a serving of pain medication, or an episode of pain, so that we can aggregate across di¤erent package sizes and across di¤erent medication strengths.
First, we assign to each analgesic product in the sales dataset the strength of its active ingredient in milligrams. To do so, we combined the descriptive data in the Nielsen dataset with the data of milligrams of a speci…c active ingredient in a speci…c formula. 45 Since the strength information was given, we were able to match the milligrams of active ingredients of the products in our dataset with the products found on the brands'websites. From the amount of milligrams of the active ingredient we derived the maximum number of pills that a consumer can take of each particular product in 24 hours. 46 We de…ne the unit of consumption as an episode of pain. An episode of pain is given by the maximum number of pills (for OTC consumption) an individual can take over 24 hours, as de…ned and required by the FDA (e.g. 3 in the case of Aleve, and from 6 to 12 for Tylenol, depending on the acetaminophen formula)
times the average number of pain days per month in the population. The average monthly number of pain days is three. 47 Market Size, Brand Market Shares and Prices. The de…nition of market size follows immediately from this: we de…ne the market size for OTC analgesic products as the US population 18 years or older.
Then, we can compute each brand's market share as the fraction of total number of episodes of pain sold 4 4 We have data on essential product attributes noted on the packages and the fraction of products sold of each such type: active ingredient, strength (regular, extra strength, etc. -as regulated by the FDA), pill type (caplet, tablet, gelcap, etc.), number of pills contained in the product, and purpose (menstrual, migraine, arthritis, general, children, etc.), although in the end we did not use these data. In this paper we look at the strategic interaction among brands, rather than products. 4 5 In the case of Ibuprofen-and Naproxen Sodium-based pain relievers, the assignment was straightforward, since these OTC products can come only in 200mg (for Ibuprofen) and 220mg (for Naproxen Sodium). In the case with Aspirin and Acetaminophen, the situation is more delicate, since these products can come in varying strengths and as a combination with other analgesic agents. 4 6 For a certain analgesic drug to be sold as an OTC drug, FDA requires that the daily (24 hours) dosage does not exceed a certain threshold (the thresholds are di¤erent for di¤erent active ingredients. For example, for acetaminophen the daily dosage is 4000 mg of this active ingredient). Recall, that the maximum number of pills that one is allowed to take in a day (according to FDA standards) is a crucial variable in de…ning the market share of a product. 4 7 This information is from the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Feb 27, 1998/47(07);134-140.
over the market size. The average price of an episode of pain is computed as the ratio of the total sales by a brand divided by the total number of episodes of pain sold in a month.
Generic Prices. Next, we construct the generic product price information which we use as the exogenous variation in our instrumental variable approach. For each month we calculate the average price of the unit of episode of pain relief for the generic brands. The resulting output is the time series of average prices of episodes of pain relief for each of the four active ingredients for the generic products. We interpret the generic prices as proxies of the marginal cost of providing care to an episode of pain.
Advertising Data
Our advertising dataset is from TNS-Media Intelligence and data is reported on monthly basis. The advertising data contain monthly advertising expenditures on each ad, and video …les of all TV advertisements for the 2001-2005 time period for each brand advertised in the OTC analgesics category. The unit of observation in the raw dataset is a single ad. There are more than four thousands di¤erent ads. For each ad, we know the amount spent in each month and the number of times that creative was shown during the speci…c month. Each ad is also associated with a video …le Advertising Content. As discussed in the Introduction, we watched all the ads and coded according to their content. Speci…cally, we recorded whether the commercial had any comparative claims -whether the product was explicitly compared to any other products. If a commercial was comparative, we also recorded which brand (or class of drugs) it was compared to (e.g. to Advil or Aleve; or to Ibuprofen-based drugs).If an ad had no comparative claims, it was classi…ed as a non-comparative ad. We are then able to gather information on the advertising relationships between all potential pairs of brands. 48 The unit of observation is a year-month-brand-attacked brand combination. For example, a line in this dataset tells how much Advil spent on comparative advertising against Tylenol in March 2004 Each month has thirty six pair combinations.
Indirect Attacks. One delicate issue is how to deal with indirect attacks. An indirect attack occurs when one brand, say Tylenol, makes a claim against "all other regular" brands. 49 Because it is not clear how to deal with this type of ads, we consider two solutions. First, we consider the case where indirect attacks are equivalent to direct attacks (e.g. Tylenol on Advil), but are divided among all the brands falling within the attacked category. So, for example, when Tylenol makes a claim against "all other regular" brands, each one of the other …ve brands is being attacked the amount of dollars spent on that advertisement divided by …ve. 50 Second, we consider the case where indirect attacks should simply be interpreted as self-promotion ads. We look at this second case in the Robustness section.
The Attack Matrix. comparative advertising during the sample period. However, the brands against which comparisons were made are only a subset of the nationally advertised brands. The targets are the "big Three:"Tylenol, Advil, Aleve, plus Excedrin. 51 Notice that these data provide some informal support for Propositions 2 and 3. The entries on the diagonal are zeroes through not attacking oneself. De…nition of a News Shock. We recorded the article name, source and date. From a data-set of articles we then constructed a data-set of news shocks. First, multiple articles reporting the same news were assigned to a unique shock ID. Second, we checked whether a news shock was associated with any new medical …ndings that were published in major scienti…c journals. As a result of this data cleaning, our news shock data-set Major vs Minor Shocks. We classi…ed the shocks by their impact. If a news shock was reported in a major national newspaper (USA Today, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, New York Times), then we classi…ed it as a major shock. Otherwise we classi…ed it as a minor shock. This classi…cation is useful to verify whether our identi…cation strategy is robust to changes in the way we de…ne news shocks. Table 3 reports the news shocks, by their title, date, scienti…c publication, and impact (Major or Minor).
News Shocks
Measuring the E¤ect of the News Shocks. For each shock that happened during period t we construct a dummy variable which is equal to 1 in all the periods after and including t: t; t + 1; . . . ; T 53 . In the empirical analysis below, we interact each of the major shocks listed in Table 3 with brand dummies. This brands and "multi-brands" …rms (stablemates). In the case of multi-brands …rms, we assume that indirect attacks carried out by a …rm do not negatively a¤ect its other stablemate brands. Thus, for example, we maintain that an indirect attack by Tylenol on all the NSAIDs is not perceived by the consumer as an attack on Motrin. Section () deals with the multi-brand speci…cation. 5 1 Motrin does not attack Tylenol because the parent company is the same; likewise, Bayer does not attack Aleve for the same reason. However, we have e¤ectively ignored these multi-product …rm relations in the data. 5 2 The keywords that we used consisted of brand names, such a "Aleve," "Tylenol," "Advil," "Vioxx," and the names of their active ingredients, such as "Naproxen," or "Acetaminophen." Then we made searches using generic terms such as "pain killers" or "analgesics." 5 3 We experimented with allowing shocks to depreciate over time at varying rates, but found out that the version without depreciating had a better explanatory power. Also, allowing shocks to a¤ect brands only in the short term (varying number of periods after the shock happened) did not prove to be an e¤ective strategy as well. approach enables us to let the data determine whether a medical news shock a¤ected the demand (instead of us arbitrarily assigning which shock a¤ected which brand in which way), and, if it did, whether a shock had a positive or negative e¤ect on that brand. Figure 1 presents the occurrence of the eight major shocks, highlighting the reaction of sales and advertising to those medical shocks.
Econometric Analysis
Here we …rst discuss the quality function upon which we base the empirical analysis. Then we illustrate the equations that we want to estimate. Finally, we deal with the sources of exogenous variation in the data that identify the parameters of the model.
A Quality Function
Quality Function. We separate out the advertising contribution to perceived quality from the intrinsic, or "base quality." That is, we write
where only Q j (:) depends on advertising levels, and W j is a variable speci…c to …rm j which a¤ects quality with no interaction with j's advertising.
Equations (6) and (11) implicitly de…ne A jj and A jk , when holding with equality, as functions of market shares and other advertising levels. Using the implicit function theorem, the partial derivatives of these implicit functions may be derived from second derivatives and cross partials of Q with respect to the various ad levels. In what follows, we assume that Q is quadratic so these second derivatives are constants. 54 This in turn allows us to estimate (6) and (11) in a simple manner.
After extensive experimentation, we chose the following functional form for the base quality:
This quality function has …ve crucial properties.
First, this function is a combination of push and pull e¤ects of advertising. The push e¤ect is given by the weighted sum of the self-promotion advertising and the outgoing comparative advertising (A jj + P k6 =j A jk ). The pull e¤ect is given by incoming advertising comparative ads (A kj ). Here, is a substitutability parameter of outgoing comparative ad with (outgoing, of course) non-comparative ads. In other words, measures how much must be spent on non-comparative advertising to replace $1 spent on comparative advertising to generate the same "push" in (own) perceived. For example, = 0:75 means that the …rm can raise its perceived quality by the same amount if it spends 1.33 dollars in comparative advertising or 1 dollar in non-comparative advertising. This parameter does not represent the full e¤ect of comparative advertising relative to non-comparative advertising, as there is also the Pull e¤ect which is directly denigrating the perceived quality of targeted competitors' brands. Were we to …nd = 1 then comparative and noncomparative advertising would have the same e¤ect on the perceived quality of a brand. If 6 = 1, then we should conclude that comparative and non-comparative advertising have di¤erent e¤ects and should be coded separately. We expect 2 (0; 1) so that outgoing attacks increases the perception of own quality, although less e¤ectively than non-comparative ads.
Second, this functional form ensures, under appropriate parameter conditions that the quality function is increasing and concave in the push e¤ect and decreasing and convex in the pull e¤ect. In particular,
we need all parameters expressed in Greek letters to be positive. The concavity and convexity ensure that the maximization problem is well behaved. Regarding the interaction between ad levels, this speci…cation has the property that outgoing comparative advertising expenditures by j are perfect substitutes with noncomparative advertising by j where is the marginal rate of substitution between the two. Thus, tells us how substitutable are own outgoing ads for self-promotion ads.
Third, treating incoming attacks as perfect substitutes as well would have very strong implications on the equilibrium levels of comparative advertising used against a given target. In any given period, each …rm should be attacked by at most one of its competitors. The data suggests that this is not the case. Hence we introduce a term involving a non-constant marginal rate of substitution between attacks, the term involving the sum of the A kj 2 A kj 2 .
Fourth, in order to allow for some positive reinforcement between attacks by di¤erent …rms on the same target, the quality function has a positive cross derivative between the di¤erent attack levels A kj . This cross e¤ect is embodied in the last term with parameter .
Finally, we capture the potential interaction between the push e¤ect of own advertising and the pull e¤ect of comparative advertising aimed at …rm j through the second term with parameter . Here the interaction term is written to re ‡ect a positive cross derivative, which is consistent with the estimation results.
Advertising Allure and Base Quality Variables. By contrast to the W j , the A variables with overbars interact with their corresponding advertising levels, and determine the marginal e¢ ciency of non-comparative and comparative advertising. For example, the higher is A jj , the lower is the marginal e¢ ciency of noncomparative advertising; while the higher is A kj , the lower the marginal e¢ ciency of attacks by k against j, in the sense of less incremental pull-down. In the econometric speci…cation, both types of variables will depend on some of the observed variables (for example news shocks) as well as some of the random shocks.
Here, we refer to the W variables as base quality, while the A variables are called advertising base allure.
The Equations to Be Estimated
Self-Promotion. After taking the derivative with respect to A jj of equation (14) we …nd the noncomparative ad equations:
A kj ; 0 9 = ; , j = 1; :::; n:
where
. We write this equation in terms of the quasi-structural parameters , , and to facilitate the discussion of the statistical signi…cance of the results. Then, we will use the results for and to learn about the structural parameters 1 and . One of the advantages of writing the regressions in terms of the quasi-structural parameters is that it illustrates how our regressions are about very intuitive relationship. Here, self-promoting advertising is a linear function of the shares of the brand; its outgoing comparative advertising and its incoming comparative advertising.
Comparative Advertising. Using the perfect substitutes property of the functional form, we have simply
For the maintained quality function we have:
, j = 1; :::; n:
Again, notice that we write the comparative advertising equation as a function of the quasi-structural parameters , , ! , and ' to facilitate the discussion of the statistical signi…cance of the results. Then, we will see how these results can be translated into information about the deep structural parameters 2 , , and . As discussed above, this regression is also about very intuitive relationships: outgoing comparative advertising is a function of the shares of the attacking and of the attacked …rm; of the self-promotion advertising of the attacked brand; of the outgoing comparative advertising of the attacked brand; and of the other brands'incoming attacks on the attacked brand.
Notice that there are some cross equation restrictions. In particular, if we estimate the coe¢ cient of
, to be positive in the self-promotion …rst order condition, then the coe¢ cient of A in the comparative …rst order condition, 2 2 2 , must be negative. These restrictions provide useful testable hypotheses.
Identi…cation
We estimate the equations (15) and (16) . As mentioned in the Introduction, there are two main concerns that we need to address: left-censoring of non-comparative and comparative advertising and endogeneity of market shares and advertising expenditures. Left-censoring occurs because in some periods some brands do not engage in non-comparative or comparative advertising (there are corner solutions). Hence the variables A jjt , A jkt , j; k = 1; :::; n; are left-censored. 55 We control for the left-censoring by running Tobit regressions.
The Nature of Endogeneity. The endogenous variables are A jjt , A jkt , A kjt , s jt , j; k = 1; :::; n. 56 To clarify the nature of the endogeneity in our analysis, we start from equation (15) . To further simplify the discussion we assume, just for the sake of exposition, that = 0 and = 0. We will drop these two assumptions at the end of this section. Then (15) becomes, with the appropriate time subscripts:
The term A jjt captures the advertising base allure of a brand, which we write as follows:
where Z jt are observable determinants of the advertising base allure. In this paper, these are the news shocks. The jt are unobservable shocks to the base allure, so jt is a structural error. Notice that jt is here assumed to be observed by …rms, but not by the econometrician.
Next, recall that the market share for brand j is written as:
; j = 0; 1; :::; n where
Because …rms observe jt when they choose advertising and because shares are a function of advertising (through Q, the perceived quality), then shares are a function of jt , and thus we will get inconsistent estimates of and if we run the following simple Tobit regression:
Top Brands vs. Other Brands. The …rst step to address the endogeneity of the market shares is to exploit the panel structure of our data to account for time-constant di¤erences across brands. Essentially, we model the unobservable jt as follows:
where j is a brand …xed e¤ect, while jt are time speci…c idiosyncratic shocks. We have investigated various speci…cations for the …xed e¤ects, and concluded that a speci…cation where there are two …xed e¤ects, one for the top brands (Advil, Aleve, Tylenol), and one for the other brands (Excedrin, Motrin, Bayer) …ts our data best. 58 We provide in Figure 2 a graphical description of the relationship between non-comparative advertising and market sales (M s j ) for all brands and months. Figure 2 shows that there are two types of brands in the market. Aleve, Advil, and Tylenol (the 'Top Brands') control large market shares compared to Excedrin, Bayer, and Motrin. This is consistent with the reported weighted market share descriptive statistics in Table 1 . This observation parallels the economic intuition that 'Top Brands'have a larger advertising base allure which translates into larger inherent quality,
A jj : Additionally, the linear …t between shares and non-comparative advertising has the same slope for the 'Top Brands' and the rest of the brands. We use the evidence from this …gure to justify the construction and use of a dummy variable 'Top Brand'.
One route is then simply to specify conditions under which there is no remaining correlation, and proceed directly to the estimates. This is the essence of Assumption 1. If this is untenable, various exclusion restrictions can remove residual endogeneity. These are described in Assumptions 2. In our regressions, we will start with estimates under the simple Assumption 1, and then proceed to deploy the other Assumption.
(Note that Assumption 1, if correct, obviates the other).
Using Timing to Identify the Parameters. The parameters of the regression (18) can be identi…ed when jt and 1 sjt are uncorrelated by estimating a variant of (18) where the jt are allowed to have di¤erent means corresponding to the brand-group …xed e¤ects. The (non-)correlation condition can be given a justi…cation, paralleling a standard assumption in a large part of the literature estimating production functions with a particular assumption on the timing of the realizations of the errors. 59 More speci…cally, a su¢ cient condition is the following:
Assumption 1 After controlling for the news shocks, which we assume to enter directly through Z jt , and after including brand …xed e¤ ects, the time speci…c idiosyncratic error jt is uncorrelated with s j , that is E jt js jt ; Z jt = 0.
Clearly, the news shocks are exogenous since they require new medical discoveries, which 'surprise'both the consumers and the …rms. Here, variation in the knowledge of the health properties of the products is captured by the news shocks. One standard interpretation for this maintained assumption is that we are basically able to observe all the variables that the …rms take into account when taking their decisions, including the news shocks (e.g. the information that consumers and …rms have at any point in time). This means that neither the econometrician nor the …rms observe jt before taking their advertising and pricing decisions. When this assumption is untenable, identi…cation can be achieved using exclusion restrictions.
We now discuss the identi…cation assumption of this paper.
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Exclusion Restrictions. We need variables that a¤ect advertising only through shares, but not directly.
We seek variables that a¤ect shares through prices, p jt , but do not a¤ect perceived quality (such the cost of providing care to an episode of pain). 61 . To this end we make the following identi…cation assumption:
Assumption 2 The prices of the generic products are set equal to their marginal costs, which are assumed to be constant. The prices of the generics enter into each branded product's market share but are excluded from the equation (18) . Formally, E jt jp G jt ; Z jt = 0, where p G jt is a vector of generic prices.
First, the marginal cost of production of a generic product must be constant; otherwise, the price of the generic would depend on the quantity produced by the branded products, and so it would not be exogenous.
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Second, Bertrand competition and free entry among generic producers of the drugs with the same active ingredient leads to pricing at marginal cost. 63 If, as to be expected, the cost of producing generic products is highly correlated with the cost of producing branded products, then generic prices have an additional indirect impact on branded products'market shares through branded prices.
In practice, there are two basic instrumental variables for (the inverse of) each share s jt : the price of the generic product that uses the same active ingredient as the brand j; and the sum of the prices of the analogous instrumental variables for its …ve competitors.
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In addition, we include the interaction of the …rst (the generic price) and the second one (the sum of the prices of the other generics); and the squared terms of the …rst and the second.
Then, we interact these two instrumental variables with the news shocks. While the news shocks enter directly in the equation (18), their interactions with prices are clearly excluded from that equation.
6 0 Notice that one could assume that the news shocks a¤ect the utility derived by consuming that product (and its demand) but do not a¤ect the advertising base allure, which is then assumed to be independent of the clinical properties of the active ingredients of a product. More formally, the news shocks enter into W jt but do not enter into Z jt . Essentially, the advertising base allure is a function of the image or reputation of a brand, and the image and reputation is independent of the medical properties of a product. This would be the case if we believed that the consumer has a full knowledge of the medical properties of a product, and thus advertising cannot change the value of such properties to the consumer. Under this interpretation, the perceived quality of a product is not a function of its medical properties and the news shocks could be used as instrumental variables. However, we do …nd that news shocks play an important role as predictors of the advertising decisions in our …rst order conditions. Thus, the evidence is against using this identi…cation assumption. 6 1 Notice that the fact we have been able to substitute out prices from the advertising …rst-order conditions means that we need not worry about changes in prices a¤ecting advertising. By substituting out prices, the impact of price on advertising goes through market share. 6 2 The marginal cost for pharmaceuticals is reasonably constant, in the sense that there are not increasing returns to scale . 6 3 Notice that we can allow generic brands to charge prices that are higher than marginal costs as long as this is explained by local conditions that national brands do not take into account when they set their prices.
To implement our estimation in our non-linear models, we use control functions Robb [1985,1986] ). 65 Our methodology follows Blundell and Smith (1986) and Rivers and Vuong (1988) .
Generalizing the Identi…cation Strategy. In the above discussion we have focused on the …rst order condition (15) under the assumptions that = 0 and = 0. It is quite clear that even if we let that and to be di¤erent from zero, we can use the same instrumental variables. This is exactly what we do.
Essentially, we use variation in the generic prices (i.e. production costs) and their interactions with the news shocks to identify the e¤ect of all of our endogenous variables. 66 7 Results
Non-Comparative Advertising
Clearly, one of the great advantages of using the functional form (14) is the transparency and simplicity of the …rst order condition above. We have a simple and clean relationship between expenditures on non-comparative advertising (A jjt ) and shares ( 1 M sjt ), outgoing comparative advertising (
, and incoming comparative ad attacks (
Baseline Regression. Column 2 of Table 4 provides the estimates of , , and when we run the following simple Tobit regression:
The coe¢ cient is small and is not estimated very precisely. To provide an economic interpretation of the coe¢ cient we compute the elasticity of non-comparative advertising to shares:
e Ajj ;sj = dA jj ds j s j A jj : 6 5 In practice, the estimation is made in two steps. First, we run the LHS endogenous variables (here market shares) on all exogenous variables, including those excluded from the second stage relationship. Then, we run the second stage regression (advertising levels here) now including the residuals from the …rst regression as an additional explanatory variable (the "Control Function") to all the second stage explanatory variables. For example, if we want to estimate the parameters of the noncomparative advertising …rst order condition (ads on sales), we …rst run shares on generic prices and news shocks, and compute the residuals. Then we run a Tobit where ads are explained by market share, news shocks (if not excluded) and the residuals. 6 6 Thus, there are no exogenous variables that identify shares but not the other advertising variables. We know that advertisers must meet the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) standard of truthful and not misleading advertising claims. All material claims must be substantiated by a reasonable basis of support and …rms need to evaluate whether their promotional message is likely to be challenged by a competitor or ad monitoring institution. Failure to have robust substantiation for a commercial may result in serious and costly consequences among which are failure to gain network approval and high litigation costs. The most common serious consequence is the publicized disruption of the ad campaign, sunk costs invested in the ad campaign and negative press related to the brand name. Over the …ve year period, we observe 15 OTC analgesics advertising claims challenged by the FTC, National Advertising Division (NAD), a competitor or a consumer. The problem with using these data is that the challenges are a function of the amount of advertising expenditures. So they cannot be considered exogenous in our regressions. This problem is not di¤erent from the one that it is encountered when we estimate market power and we do not have information on the marginal cost. Adding more equations (the …rst order condition for price and the demand equation) would let us identify I , , and .
We …nd the median elasticity to be equal to 0:312, which means that a 10 percent increase in market share, s j , implies a 3% increase in non-comparative advertising. This is clearly a fairly weak relationship.
The substitutability parameter, , is estimated to be 0:700. This means that each dollar spent on comparative ad increases the perceived quality of the attacking brand by the same amount as 70 cents spent on non-comparative ad. Notice that comparative advertising also pulls down the rivals, which is what we discuss next.
The parameter, is estimated to be 0:590. This suggests that incoming attacks do have a sizeable negative e¤ect on the perceived quality of the attacked …rm. Keeping shares constant (shares are endogenous, so they will change with changes in A jkt ), every dollar spent on incoming attacks requires 59 cents to mitigate.
Top Brand Dummy. As discussed in Section (??), one simple way to control for the endogeneity of shares and advertising expenditures is by adding the Top Brand dummy. Formally, we then have j = T B for j 2 fAdvil; Aleve; T ylenolg and j = OB for fM otrin; Excedrin, Bayerg (for obvious collinearity reasons, only the …xed e¤ect for Top Brand will be reported). Given our relatively small sample, it helps to reduce the number of brand …xed e¤ects. Another useful advantage of having such group-type …xed e¤ects is that we avoid the incidental parameter problem that would have been there with the nonlinear Tobit regression and individual brand-speci…c …xed e¤ects.
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This dummy controls for the Top Brands' advertising base allure advantage, so that it picks up any persistent component of such advantage. The remaining source of endogeneity in our regressions then comes from any potential correlation between jt and s jt . In Column 3 of Table 4 the Top Brand …xed e¤ect, T B , has a negative sign, which means that the larger …rms, Aleve, Tylenol and Advil have inherently higher advertising base allure than the other brands.
This result is not very robust across speci…cations.
Con…rming that the endogeneity concern is relevant in our context, Column 3 shows that the coe¢ cient , equal to 0:212, is much larger than in Column 2 and is estimated very precisely. The corresponding median elasticity of self-proming ads to shares is now equal to 2:208, which means that a 10 percent increase in market share, s j , implies a 22:08% increase in non-comparative advertising. This is a very strong relationship, which con…rms the suggestion of Proposition 1, that larger …rms engage in more non-comparative advertising to push up perceived quality and demand.
The results for the parameters and are unchanged.
Major News Shocks. Column 4 adds on the major news shocks vector Z. Thus, we estimate their e¤ects on the amount spent on non-comparative advertising by getting estimates for . Under Assumption 1, we get consistent estimates of the parameters of the model. The idea is that any component of the unobservable that remains, after controlling for persistent advertising base allure advantages (picked up by the Top Brand dummy) and news shocks, is not observed by the …rms before making their advertising and pricing decisions.
Formally, we estomate the regression (19) , where A jjt is now written as follows:
The way we deal with news shocks is the following. We interact each news shock with brand dummies for all brands. This leads to six (brands) times eight (shocks) variables to include in the regression. This way to deal with the shocks lets the data pick up which shocks had an impact on the …rms'decisions and, also, it allows the shocks to have di¤erent e¤ects on di¤erent brands. Because of the large number of variables, we do not report the results for the shocks. is now equal to 0:452, down from 0:700 in Column 1 and 0:575 in Column 4. As we control for more components of the unobservable, we reduce the extent to which di¤erent types of advertising expenditures are estimated to be correlated. One way to interpret this …nding is that we estimate correlations that are biased upward when do not control for variables (here, news shocks) that are observed by …rms and consumers. In addition to the estimates estimates of , , , the Top Brand …xed e¤ects, and the constant term, we also report the coe¢ cient estimates of the control functions associated with the endogenous variables.
As discussed in Blundell and Smith (1986) , statistically signi…cant coe¢ cients of the control functions would suggest that, even after including the Top Brand …xed e¤ects and accounting for all the news shocks, the relationship between shares and advertising expenditures would still be estimated with a bias if we did not use generic prices as instrumental variables.
First, in Column 6 we see that the coe¢ cient estimate (5:261) of the control function of 1 M sjt is not statistically signi…cant. There are two possible explanations. First, shares are indeed not endogenous, after including the Top Brand …xed e¤ect and news shocks. Second, generic prices do not explain much of the variation in shares, and so they are not appropriate instruments for shares in the second stage. To choose between two explanations, we regress shares on just the Top Brand …xed e¤ect and the news shocks, and we …nd that R 2 of this regression is equal to 0:9857. That is, there is only less than 2 percent of the variation in shares that still needs to be explained, and the generic prices explain a good fraction of it, as the R 2 of the this residual variation on the generic prices is 0:3181. Moreover, we can reject the null hypothesis that all the coe¢ cients of the generic prices in the …rst stage regression are equal to zero (the F test is reported in the table as well). Thus, we conclude that the parameters associated with shares are identi…ed o¤ crosssectional variation, rather than by within-brand variation, and we also conclude that the endogeneity of the shares is pretty much controlled for by the inclusion of the Top Brand …xed e¤ects and the news shocks.
Our interpretation is then that, after including the Top Brand …xed e¤ect and news shocks, the remaining endogeneity of the shares (that is, their correlation with the remaining unobservables) is not empirically signi…cant.
The conclusions are not much di¤erent as far as the estimates of , . We …nd that the generic prices do a fair job at explaining the …rst stage variation in outgoing comparative advertising and in incoming attacks.
In particular, the F tests lead to the rejection of the null hypotheses that generic prices do not explain any of the …rst stage variation, and the generic prices explain a fair amount of the variation in the dependent variables that is not explained by the second stage exogenous variables (the R 2 of the residual variations are equal to 0:4483 and 0:3239).
A Brief Summary. We summarize our empirical analysis of the …rst order condition 15) as follows. First, Proposition 1's suggestion that higher shares, ceteris paribus, are associated with higher non-comparative advertising is con…rmed. In particular, the results in Table 4 imply the elasticity of self-promoting advertising expenditures to shares is between 1 and 1:5.
Second, as we expected, we …nd evidence of a clear endogeneity of market shares (and other advertising variables) in the advertising …rst order conditions, which creates a substantial downward bias on the coe¢ -cient of market shares and upward bias on the coe¢ cients of outgoing and incoming comparative advertising.
We …nd that the inclusion of a Top Brand …xed e¤ect and of brand-speci…c news shocks controls for the endogeneity in the variables. In the speci…cations where it is estimated precisely, the Top Brand …xed e¤ect,
T B , has a negative sign, which means that the larger …rms, Aleve, Tylenol and Advil have inherently higher advertising base allure than the other brands.
Finally, the estimates of the components of the Net Persuasion function lie within the expected ranges.
Outgoing attacks are half as powerful as direct non-comparative ads in raising perceived quality. For given shares, incoming attacks draw down a brand by around 40 cents, in terms of the non-comparative ads that restore Net Persuasion.
Comparative Advertising
The second relation that we test is the comparative ad relation (16) . The unit of observation now is a pair of brands, as we study attacks of one brand, j, on another brand, k. Table 5 follows the same structure as Table 4 : we start with a simple tobit speci…cation; then, we add (pair-speci…c) brand dummies; then, we add shocks. We conclude the analysis by looking how the results change if we use generic prices as instrumental variables.
Baseline Regression. Column 2 of Table 5 provides the estimates of , , , and ' when we run the following simple Tobit regression:
We estimate precisely and equal to 2:457. This result provides evidence in support of the theoretical model developed in Section (3). Propositions 2 and 3 predict that …rms have a greater incentive to attack larger …rms, and this incentive is increasing in the share of the attacker, thus should be positive. To provide a sense of the economic interpretation of this result, we can again compute elasticities. The median elasticity with respect to s jt , e A jk ;sj = dA jk dsj sj A jk , is equal to 1:580 and the one with respect to s kt is equal to 1:504. That is, a 10 percent higher market share (of the attacker or of the attacked) implies that the comparative ads against that brand are higher by approximately 15 percent.
Next, we …nd that the coe¢ cient estimate of is equal to 0:0432 and that of ! is equal to 0:033.
These are economically small numbers. For example, the …rst says that for each dollar spent by the attacked k in self-promoting advertising, and for given shares, the attacker …rm j lowers its attacks by 4 cents If we look across the columns of the table, we notice that in all the speci…cations these coe¢ cients are estimated to have small magnitudes and, with the exception of Column 2, they are never statistically signi…cant.
Overall, the evidence in Table 5 suggests that neither the attacked's self-promoting advertising, A kkt nor its outgoing comparative ads, P l6 =k A klt , have a direct e¤ect on the comparative advertising decision of the attacking …rm j.
Finally, we estimate ' equal to 0:307. This means that …rm j spends 30:7 cents attacking …rm k for each dollar that the j's competitors (l 6 = k; j) spend attacking …rm k. This is a strong e¤ect and provides evidence that …rms carry attacks in a jointly fashion.
Pair-Speci…c Brand Dummies. In Column 3 we add pair speci…c brand dummies. In particular, we run the tobit regression (20) , where jkt is replaced by T B;T B + T B;OB + OB;OB + jkt , with
Here, jk = T B;T B if j and k are both Top Brands, jk = T B;OB if j is a Top Brand (i.e., Advil, Aleve, Tylenol) and k is an Other Brand, and likewise for OB;T B and OB;OB (one is omitted because we include a constant term in the regression). For example, T B;T B is the pairwise group-…xed e¤ect (to be estimated) if both the 'attacker', j, and the 'attacked', k, are top brands.
Most notably, is estimated quite smaller, as it is now equal to 0:867 and, correspondingly, the median elasticity with respect to s jt is now equal to 0:558 and the one with respect to s kt is equal to 0:531. Notice, however, that the brand dummies are all very small and two out of three are not statistically signi…cant.
This suggests that simply adding brand dummies is not an appropriate modeling choice, since it seems to be introducing just noise in the estimation.
News Shocks. Column 4 and 5 add, respectively, major and minor shocks in the tobit regression. The results are pretty analogous in these two columns. Adding the news shocks increases the magnitude of , bringing it to 1:571. Correspondingly, the median elasticity with respect to s jt is now equal to 1:010 and the one with respect to s kt is equal to 0:962: These numbers are remarkably close to the values of elasticities that we found in Table 4 , where the elasticity of self-promoting advertising expenditures to shares is between 1 and 1:5.
Generic Prices as Instrumental Variables. Columns 6, 7, and 8 show the results when we instrument the endogenous variables with generic prices and their interactions with the news shocks. There are two main result out of these three columns. First, a direct comparison of Column 6 (and 7 and 8) with
Column 5 shows that ' might actually be downward biased when we do not instrument P l;j6 =k A lkt . It is now estimated equal to 0:443, up from 0:354. Second, is still estimated positive, con…rming that …rms have a greater incentive to attack larger …rms, and this incentive is increasing in the share of the attacker.
Notice that in Column 8, where the interaction term of s jt and s kt enters linearly, the median elasticities of outgoing comparative ads with respect to s jt and with respect to s kt are much.larger.
A Brief Summary. We summarize our empirical analysis of the …rst order condition (16) as follows. First, we …nd evidence in support of propositions 2 and 3, which predict that …rms have a greater incentive to attack larger …rms, and this incentive is increasing in the share of the attacker.
Second, neither the attacked's self-promoting advertising, A kkt nor its outgoing comparative ads, P l6 =k A klt , have a direct e¤ect on the comparative advertising decision of the attacking …rm j.
Finally, …rm j spends more than 40 cents attacking …rm k for each dollar that the j's competitors (l 6 = k; j) spend attacking …rm k, for given shares.
The Structural Parameters of the Model [In Progress]
Notice that all the structural parameters of the model are identi…ed.
If we use the speci…cations with all the shocks, and without instrumenting using the generic prices, we …nd the following: The marginal cost of comparative advertising is found to be equal to = 1:4714, while the cost of self-promoting advertising is equal to 1. This con…rms our intuition that comparative ads are more expensive as they carry more risk. They carry more risk because …rms might be challenged and they might have to drop an ad.
From these numbers we can compute the marginal rate of substitutions of one type of ad for the other.
is the M RS Ajj ;A jk , or the marginal rate of substitution of self-promoting ads for outgoing comp ads. Finding = 0:451 tells us that for each dollar spent in comp ads, one can save 45:1 cents in self promotion and keep the perceived quality unchanged.
Robustness [IN PROGRESS]
In our view, the main issue that we have to deal with is whether by omitting dynamic e¤ects, we introduce a bias in the estimation of the relationships between the main variables of the model. There are two related dynamic features that our static model might be missing. First, A jj and A jk might be related to the goodwill of a …rm, and that goodwill might depend on past advertising decision of the …rm. We can check the importance of this aspect by adding lags in our regressions. Second, as Dube, Hitsch, Manchanda [2005] show in their descriptive analysis, pulsing might play an important role in advertising decisions depending on the industry that we look at. In this section, we look at these two features and check, indirectly, whether omitting them from the analysis might bias our results. Because we are just checking for the robustness of the results, we only look at the non-comparative advertising …rst order condition.
[TO BE COMPLETED]
Goodwill. Advertising goodwill is the idea that past advertising is like an investment over time which creates a stock at any moment. This stock, in turn, is subject to depreciation as the consmuer "forgets" past ads. If there are strong stock e¤ects (depreciation is not quick), then …rms are engaged in a dynamic game.
Solving such a game and writing the appropriate structural model would be substantially more involved than the simple static model characterized above.
Here we essentially estimate the regression (19) after including the one month lagged value of A jjt .
[TO BE DONE]
Pulsing. Pulsing is the phenomenon of uneven advertising levels over time. A campaign will have a speci…c start date, and a series of ads will be run at quite high intensity. In many industries, there is a considerable lag (or at least a lull) until the next campaign starts up (a new "media blitz). This pattern is thought more e¤ective than running ads at a steady level, in part because of attention thresholds for individuals' perception, etc.
One very simple way to test whether pulsing occur in this industry is the following: We compare how the results change if we use quarterly instead of monthly data. Dube, Hitsch, Manchanda [2005] show very irregular episodes of advertising to test their theory of pulsing. Clearly, the more one aggregates the data over time, the less irregular the episodes of advertising become. So our idea is that if there is pulsing in our monthly data, and if accounting for pulsing would a¤ect our results radically, then we should see sizeable di¤erences in the estimates that we get by using quarterly instead of monthly data.
Hence we estimate the regressions (19) and (20), but with quarterly instead of monthly data.
[TO BE DONE]
Conclusions [Preliminary]
The paper proposes a novel oligopoly model of advertising, based on persuasive advertising which shifts ("pulls up") perceived product qualities. The model also introduces comparative advertising as having both a pull up e¤ect on own perceived quality, and a "pull-down"e¤ect on a targeted rival's quality. The empirical results for the non-comparative advertising are very clean. First, half of a comparative ad constitues pure push, insofar it has the same e¤ect on own perceived quality as half the dollar amount spent on a noncomparative ad. What happens to the other half is damage in ‡icted on the target of the comparative ad.
First, it takes approximately 50 cents of non-comparative ads to o¤set every incoming dollar of attack, and that is just in terms of the net persuasion part of advertising. The other part of the harm to a rival is in the Pull-Down e¤ect, which involves a further loss.
The (linearized) comparative ads estimates indicate that there is a strong positive e¤ect of larger size in comparative advertising, and a much stronger (in terms of elasticity) positive e¤ect of larger size of the target. This concurs with the theoretical predictions of the Push-Pull model, and it is apparent in the raw data that the largest target is the largest …rm (Tylenol).
The e¤ects of advertising in this Push-Pull set-up are channeled through quality di¤erences. This gives quite a negative view of comparative ads, in the sense that there is much wasteful battling between brands to and fro just to stay a ‡oat. 69 This feature is reminiscent of the Zero-Sum Game critique of advertising; that it serves solely to reshu-e demand and …rms are better o¤ if they could agree not to do it (they would save the expense). The critique is a fortiori true of comparative advertising, at least as modeled though the Push-Pull model. Firms would be better o¤ if they could agree not to do it. This reason might partially explain why it is not prevalent in many industries. As a form of quasi-collusion, …rms do not begin the process because they realize it might trigger responses. It is noteworthy in this regard that comparative advertising is being used more and more, coinciding with a recession, when collusion typically has more trouble surviving.
When consumers have di¤erent tastes over di¤erent characteristics, comparative advertising (done by di¤erent parties in di¤erent characteristics directions) may serve to enhance the perceived horizontal di¤er-entiation between products. This e¤ect is closed down in the current model, but introducing it would likely give both better estimates as well as an improved perspective on the social bene…ts of the practice, at least insofar as the advertising informs heterogenous consumers about true product performance di¤erences. F ir s t S t a g e R e s id u a l R 2 , k6 =j A kj R 2 = 0 .3 2 3 9
Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01.
1) The three first stage regressions are the same for the last three columns. F ir s t S t a g e R e s id u a l R 2 , l6 =k,j A lk R 2 = 0 .3 0 7
1) The three first stage regressions are the same for the last three columns.
2) F Test (1st Stage) is a test of whether the coefficients of the ivs are all equal to zero in the first stage.
3) First Stage Full R 2 is the R 2 of the first stage regression, without including the ivs. 4) First Stage Residual R 2 is the R 2 of the regressions of the residuals of the first stage regression without ivs on the ivs. It says how much of the residual variation in the first stage is explained by the ivs. 5) The F test and R 2 for the first stage for Ms jt are given in Table 4 
